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liability are common in § 19831 litigation. The purpose of this presentation is to examine two recent Supreme Court decisions, Connick
v. Thompson2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal3 with an eye to their impact on
how lower federal courts will assess such claims in the wake of new
constraints imposed by these cases. The focus of the discussion will
be on developments in single-incident liability cases after Connick
and supervisory liability claims after Iqbal.
II.

THE DEMISE OF SINGLE INCIDENT LIABILITY
A.

City of Canton v. Harris

In City of Canton v. Harris,4 the Court determined what
would make a government entity liable for an admitted violation of
the Constitution by a non-policymaking employee.5 In City of Canton, the respondent, Geraldine Harris, was arrested and brought to a
police station.6 Mrs. Harris displayed signs requiring medical attention.7 On several occasions she slumped to the ground and fell, but
instead of giving her medical support, the jail personnel “left [her] lying on the floor to prevent her from falling again.”8 She was asked,
but incoherently responded, as to whether she required medical attention.9 Eventually, when she was released, her family provided her
with medical support.10
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, it was conceded that there was an underlying Fourteenth Amendment11 constitutional violation.12 Specifically, Mrs. Harris, as a pre-trial detainee,
was deprived of necessary medical attention.13 The question raised
1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
3
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
4
489 U.S. 378 (1989).
5
Id. at 380.
6
Id. at 381.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 381.
10
Id.
11
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 n.8.
13
See id. (“First, petitioner has conceded that, as the case comes to us, we must assume
that respondent‟s constitutional right to receive medical care was denied by city
employees—whatever the nature of that right might be.” (citing Transcript of Oral Argument
2
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was what must the respondent prove in order to hold the City of Canton liable for the underlying constitutional violation?14 In City of
Canton, the Court unanimously rejected the City‟s argument that municipal liability can be imposed only where the challenged policy is
itself unconstitutional and concluded that “there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a „failure to train‟ can be the basis for
liability under § 1983.”15 Noting substantial disagreement among the
lower courts as to the level of culpability required in “failure to train”
cases, the Court went on to hold that “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure
to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact.”16 The City of Canton “deliberate indifference” standard is based on a construction of the
§ 1983 causation language, and it is clear that the statutory standard
has nothing to do with the level of culpability that may be required to
make out the underlying constitutional wrong.17 The Court in City of
Canton decided that deliberate indifference is what is required to establish the municipal policy as the “moving force” behind or cause of
the constitutional violation.18 As the Court later explained, the “term
was used in the [City of] Canton case for the . . . purpose of identifying the threshold for holding a city responsible for the constitutional
torts committed by its inadequately trained agents.”19
The Court indicated two ways the plaintiff may show the requisite objective deliberate indifference in order to establish municipal liability in a failure-to-train case. First, a plaintiff may establish
deliberate indifference by demonstrating a failure to train officers in a
specific area where there is an obvious need for training to avoid violations of citizens‟ constitutional rights.20 The Court noted the following:
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to
specific officers or employees the need for more or
at 8-9, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/19801989/1988/1988_86_1088#argument)).
14
Id. at 383.
15
Id. at 387.
16
Id. at 388.
17
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 n.8.
18
Id. at 388 (quoting Monell v. Dep‟t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
19
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992).
20
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
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different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,
that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be
said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.21
The example all of the Justices agreed would demonstrate “deliberate
indifference,” is where city policymakers provide no training on the
constitutional limits of the use of deadly force to armed police officers who are given authority to arrest fleeing felons.22 Without training, officers will likely commit constitutional violations and a pattern
is not needed to establish the deliberate indifference of the city in
failing to train where the outcome of no training is so predictable and
obvious. Second, as Justice O‟Connor suggested in her partial concurrence, a plaintiff may rely on a pattern of unconstitutional conduct
that is so pervasive as to imply actual or constructive knowledge on
the part of policymakers, whose deliberate indifference, evidenced by
a failure to correct once the need for training became obvious, would
be attributable to the municipality.23 Both of these methods, the obviousness method and the constructive notice method, are discussed
in Sornberger v. City of Knoxville.24
B.

Board of County Commissioners v. Brown

In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown,25 the Supreme
Court revisited the issue of municipal liability under § 1983 in the
context of a single bad hiring decision made by a county sheriff who
was stipulated to be the final policymaker for the county in matters of
law enforcement.26 Specifically, the sheriff hired his nephew‟s son,
Burns, for the position of reserve deputy.27 In addition to having no
training,28 Burns had a criminal record consisting of various traffic

21

Id.
Id. at 390 n.10.
23
Id. at 396 (O‟Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24
434 F.3d 1006, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 2006).
25
520 U.S. 397 (1997).
26
Id. at 402.
27
Id. at 401.
28
Brown did not go to the Supreme Court on the issue of failure to train, but, on remand,
the Fifth Circuit reinstated the jury verdict for the plaintiff on the failure to train claim. Id. at
402. The Fifth Circuit held that because Deputy Burns did not receive any training where
there was an obvious need to train, a single incident could result in county liability. Brown
v. Bryan Cnty., 219 F.3d 450, 465 (5th Cir. 2000).
22
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violations and misdemeanors.29 However, because none of the
crimes were felonies under Oklahoma law, he could not be barred
from this position.30
Respondent was injured when she was forcibly extracted from
a vehicle driven by her husband.31 Mr. Brown was avoiding a police
checkpoint and was eventually stopped by a squad car in which Reserve Deputy Burns was riding.32 Burns removed Mrs. Brown from
the vehicle with such force that he caused severe injury to her
knees.33
Respondent sued both Burns and the county under § 1983.34
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court‟s entry of judgment on the jury‟s verdict against Burns
for excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment.35 The majority of the panel also affirmed the judgment against the county
based on Sheriff Moore‟s decision to hire Burns without adequately
investigating his background.36 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
Moore‟s inadequate screening and hiring of Burns demonstrated “deliberate indifference to the public‟s welfare.”37
The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice
O‟Connor, reversed the court of appeals, distinguishing Brown‟s
case, involving a claim that a single lawful hiring decision ultimately
resulted in a constitutional violation, from a case “[w]here a plaintiff
claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or
directs an employee to do so.”38 As the Court noted, its prior cases,
recognizing municipal liability based on a single act or decision attributed to the government entity, involved decisions of local legislative
bodies or policymakers that directly effected or ordered someone to
effect a constitutional deprivation.39 In such cases, there are no real
29

Brown, 520 U.S. at 401.
Id.
31
Id. at 400-01.
32
Id. at 400.
33
Id. at 400-01.
34
Brown, 520 U.S. at 401.
35
Id. at 402.
36
Id.
37
Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 67 F.3d 1174, 1184 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated, 520 U.S. 397
(1997).
38
Brown, 520 U.S. at 402-04.
39
Id. at 403-04. The Court explained:
To the extent that we have recognized a cause of action under § 1983
based on a single decision attributable to a municipality, we have done
so only where the evidence that the municipality had acted and that the
30
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problems with respect to the issues of fault or causation.
Because the respondent did not allege a pattern of “bad hires”
in Brown, the argument for county liability was based on Sheriff
Moore‟s alleged deliberate indifference in failing to investigate
Burns‟s background. The theory was that “Burns‟[s] use of excessive
force was the plainly obvious consequence of Sheriff Moore‟s failure
to screen Burns‟[s] record.”40 The majority, however, rejected respondent‟s effort to analogize her inadequate screening case to a failure-to-train case.41 Justice O‟Connor noted:
In attempting to import the reasoning of [City of]
Canton into the hiring context, respondent ignores the
fact that predicting the consequence of a single hiring
decision, even one based on an inadequate assessment
of a record, is far more difficult than predicting what
might flow from the failure to train a single law enforcement officer as to a specific skill necessary to the
discharge of his duties. As our decision in [City of]

plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of federal rights also proved fault and
causation. For example, Owen v. Independence and Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc. involved formal decisions of municipal legislative bodies.
In Owen, the city council allegedly censured and discharged an employee without a hearing. In Fact Concerts, the city council canceled a
license permitting a concert following a dispute over the performance‟s
content. Neither decision reflected implementation of a generally applicable rule. But we did not question that each decision, duly promulgated
by city lawmakers, could trigger municipal liability if the decision itself
were found to be unconstitutional. Because fault and causation were obvious in each case, proof that the municipality‟s decision was unconstitutional would suffice to establish that the municipality itself was liable for
the plaintiff‟s constitutional injury. Similarly, Pembaur v. Cincinnati
concerned a decision by a county prosecutor, acting as the county‟s final
decisionmaker to direct county deputies to forcibly enter petitioner‟s
place of business to serve capiases upon third parties. Relying on Owen
and Newport, we concluded that a final decisionmaker‟s adoption of a
course of action “tailored to a particular situation and not intended to
control decisions in later situations” may, in some circumstances, give
rise to municipal liability under § 1983. In Pembaur, it was not disputed
that the prosecutor had specifically directed the action resulting in the
deprivation of petitioner‟s rights. The conclusion that the decision was
that of a final municipal decision-maker and was therefore properly attributable to the municipality established municipal liability. No questions of fault or causation arose.
Id. at 405-06 (citations omitted).
40
Id. at 408-09.
41
Id. at 409.
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Canton makes clear, “deliberate indifference” is a
stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. Unlike the risk from a particular
glaring omission in a training regimen, the risk from a
single instance of inadequate screening of an applicant‟s background is not “obvious” in the abstract; rather, it depends upon the background of the applicant.
A lack of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that an
unfit officer will be hired, and that the unfit officer
will, when placed in a particular position to affect the
rights of citizens, act improperly. But that is only a
generalized showing of risk. The fact that inadequate
scrutiny of an applicant‟s background would make a
violation of rights more likely cannot alone give rise to
an inference that a policymaker‟s failure to scrutinize
the record of a particular applicant produced a specific
constitutional violation.42
The majority opinion concluded the following:
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant‟s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of
a third party‟s federally protected right can the official‟s failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant‟s
background constitute “deliberate indifference.”43
Thus, the majority insisted on evidence from which a jury could find
that had Sheriff Moore adequately screened Deputy Burns‟s background he “should have concluded that Burns‟[s] use of excessive
force would be a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.”44 In the view of the majority, scrutiny of Burns‟s record did
not produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found
that Sheriff Moore‟s hiring decision reflected deliberate indifference
to “an obvious risk” that Burns would use excessive force.45

42
43
44
45

Brown, 520 U.S. at 410-11.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 415.
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The Connick Decision

The recent opinion of the Supreme Court in Connick will undoubtedly make it more difficult for plaintiffs to assert failure-to-train
claims based on single-incident violations and a theory of obviousness in the need for training.46 In a 5-to-4 decision, with the majority
opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court held that Harry Connick, the Orleans Parish District Attorney in Louisiana, could not be
sued for damages in his official capacity47 for failure to train his
prosecutors as to Brady obligations.48
In Connick, John Thompson had been convicted of attempted
armed robbery and was subsequently convicted of an unrelated murder; he chose not to testify at his murder trial because of the possibility of impeachment from the robbery conviction.49 “Thompson spent
eighteen years in prison, including fourteen years on death row,” and
was one month away from execution when a private investigator
working on his case “discovered . . . undisclosed evidence from his
armed robbery trial.”50 As it turned out, a prosecutor on the robbery
trial had withheld blood-test evidence, which exonerated Thompson
of the armed robbery and thus infected the murder conviction as
well.51
The robbery conviction was vacated and the murder case was
retried with a jury verdict of not guilty.52 As a result, Thompson
brought a wrongful conviction suit against the district attorney‟s office, claiming that by failing to disclose the crime lab report, the district attorney‟s office violated Brady v. Maryland.53 Two questions
were presented in Connick. First, was this a single incident case?54
Second, if so, was there sufficient evidence to prove the requisite de46
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356 (holding that one Brady violation alone was insufficient
for a failure-to-train claim).
47
See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338-39 (2009) (granting absolute immunity to prosecutors and supervising attorneys in failure-to-train claims and thereby eliminating
any possibility of a suit against Connick in his individual capacity for failure-to-train in performing his administrative functions as head of the office).
48
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (placing an obligation on a prosecutor to disclose all exculpatory evidence to an accused “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).
49
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1356.
52
Id. at 1356-57.
53
373 U.S. 83 (1963); Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357.
54
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
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liberate indifference standard on the part of the district attorney‟s office?55 Over a twenty-year period “no fewer than five [different]
prosecutors” had known about and failed to turn over the exculpatory
blood-test evidence.56 Indeed, there were ten exhibits disclosed at the
retrial that had not been disclosed at the initial murder trial.57 The
majority viewed this egregious conduct over a twenty-year period as
a “single incident” and, overturning a fourteen-million-dollar verdict
in Thompson‟s favor, stated that “[f]ailure to train prosecutors in
their Brady obligations does not fall within the narrow range of Canton‟s hypothesized single-incident liability.”58 The Court distinguished prosecutors from police officers in terms of legal education
and training needs, concluding that “[a] licensed attorney making legal judgments, in his capacity as a prosecutor, about Brady material
simply does not present the same „highly predictable‟ constitutional
danger as Canton‟s untrained officer.”59 According to the majority,
“The reason why the Canton hypothetical is inapplicable is that attorneys, unlike police officers, are equipped with the tools to find, interpret, and apply legal principles.”60 The majority underscored that
“[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is „ordinarily necessary‟ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train”61 and observed that none of the
four convictions that had been overturned due to Brady violations in
the ten-year period prior to Thompson‟s robbery trial had “involved
failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or
scientific evidence of any kind,” and thus, none could have put Connick on notice as to the need for specific training to avoid the constitutional violation in Thompson‟s case.62
Justice Ginsburg wrote a strong dissent, which she read from
the bench.63 The dissenters saw the Brady violations in Thompson‟s
case as “not singular” and “not aberrational,” but rather “just what
one would expect given the attitude toward Brady pervasive in the
District Attorney‟s Office.”64 Justice Ginsburg concluded that if
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1361 (majority opinion).
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-63.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1360 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).
Id.
Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1384.
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prosecutors were not trained about Brady, it is foreseeable that conduct like this would occur, and by not training its prosecutors, the district attorney‟s office was deliberately indifferent to “a legal requirement fundamental to a fair trial.”65
D.

Cases Post-Connick

After deciding Connick, the Court granted certiorari in Conn
v. City of Reno66 and vacated and remanded in light of
Connick.67 Following a suicide in jail, the Ninth Circuit found that
failing to adopt and implement policies on suicide prevention established deliberate indifference.68 On remand, the district court‟s grant
of summary judgment for the city was reinstated by the Ninth Circuit.69 Other post-Connick cases also signal a tougher hurdle for
plaintiffs in establishing liability based on the Canton single-incident
theory.
1.

Craig v. Floyd County

In Craig v. Floyd County,70 there appeared to be some disagreement as to whether the injury to plaintiff was the result of a single incident. Craig was tasered and fell to the ground in a pool of his
own blood.71 He was detained for nine days in jail and received sixteen health evaluations from nine different employees of the Georgia
Correctional System before he got a CT scan, which indicated he required neurological surgery.72 The majority stated that this was a
single incident and one that was insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference.73 The concurring opinion questioned whether it was a
single incident when there was multiple employees involved including nine different employees and sixteen evaluations.74
Litigants may find that the facts of a case often present a
question about whether the case will be viewed as a single-incident
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
591 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2010).
City of Reno v. Conn, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011).
Conn, 591 F.3d at 1105.
Conn v. City of Reno, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011).
643 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1312-13 (Cox, J., concurring).
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situation or not. Unless plaintiffs have a case where the need for
training is plainly obvious, it would behoove plaintiffs to look for a
pattern of incidents, in addition to their own, that would have put policymakers on notice of a problem. Defendants, of course, should
raise the “single-incident flag” whenever they can and argue that
there was no obvious need to train absent a pattern of constitutional
violations.
2.

Cash v. County of Erie

In Cash v. County of Erie,75 the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a guard while she was in custody at the Erie County Holding Center.76 While the state of New York categorically condemned
any sexual activity between prisoners and guards, supervisors were
aware of some history of “consensual” sexual favors being performed
by prisoners for guards.77 The court explicitly stated that this was not
a failure-to-train case.78 The court reasoned that based on the law,
every police officer or jail guard knows that any form of sexual conduct with prisoners, unwanted and wanted alike, is unacceptable.79
This kind of case is one in which there is absolutely no discretion for
an individual to act in a manner contrary to that dictated by law.80
The deliberate indifference stems not from a failure to train, but from
the defendant‟s own failure to establish a policy that would protect
against the likelihood of sexual contact between guards and prisoners.81
The issue in Cash was whether the entity had a policy consistent with the law to protect their female inmates from sexual contact
with guards.82 According to the majority of the panel, a reasonable
jury could have found that once the defendants learned that guards
were violating an absolute proscription in any respect, the County of
Erie‟s actions to prevent future violations were deficient.83 In sum,
the court concluded that a jury could find that “mere reiteration of the

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

654 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 328.
Id. at 329-30.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 336-37.
Cash, 654 F.3d at 336.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id.
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proscriptive policy unaccompanied by any proactive steps to minimize the opportunity for exploitation, as for example by prohibiting
unmonitored one-on-one interactions between guards and prisoners,
demonstrated deliberate indifference to defendants‟ affirmative duty
to protect prisoners from sexual exploitation.”84
Chief Judge Jacobs issued a vehement dissent, arguing that
the decision was inconsistent with Connick because it was a singleincident liability case with one sexual assault.85 He argued that the
previous encounters were not sexual assaults and therefore could not
have put the institution on notice.86 As with Craig, the decision reflects disagreement about whether specific facts give rise to a singleincident theory of liability, or whether a pattern has been alleged sufficiently to put the entity on notice of a problem.87
III.

INTERPRETATIONS OF SINGLE INCIDENT LIABILITY

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Cases such as Cash involving
municipal liability can be complicated, but can often be categorized
as failure to train or failure to supervise cases, or perhaps even both.88
The question regarding Cash is whether the plaintiff is trying to establish municipal liability based on the municipality‟s inaction of
failing to implement a policy. There are additional cases that discussed municipal liability such as the leading precedent case in the
Second Circuit, Walker v. City of New York.89 Officers are not traditionally trained on moral aspects of the job, such as not lying.90
However, in Walker, the court said that if officers engage in a pattern
of lying, that they may need training on not lying.91
MR. RUDIN: Walker also established the theory that the City
of New York could be held liable for a pattern of misconduct by
84

Id.
Cash, 654 F.3d at 346 (Jacob, C.J., dissenting).
86
See id. at 345 (enumerating a parade of horribles that will likely result from holding
municipalities liable in such situations and arguing that the court would essentially be telling
police forces and prisons how to do their business, and how to spend their money and what
policies they should or should not have in place).
87
See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312-13 (Cox, J., concurring) (“I am not satisfied that this case
involves a „single incident.‟ I do not have to count „incidents,‟ however, to conclude that
Craig has failed to offer proof that can support a finding that there was a custom, policy or
practice of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”).
88
See generally Cash, 654 F.3d 324.
89
974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992).
90
Id. at 295, 299-301.
91
Id. at 301.
85
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prosecutors.92 While Connick rejects that liability may be based upon
a failure to train prosecutors in their Brady obligations absent a history of prior similar misconduct showing a need to train, it was still the
first Supreme Court case to accept the holding in Walker that a municipality can be held liable for an unlawful policy under Brady even
though prosecutors individually would have absolute immunity.93
With no Justice disagreeing that there could be such liability, Connick essentially lays out a roadmap to establish liability in failure to
train cases.94
The problem in Connick is that the jury rejected the alternative theory of liability of an unlawful Brady disclosure policy, as opposed to the theory that the jury found and the Supreme Court reviewed, which was a failure-to-train prosecutors in their Brady
obligations.95 The jury was presented with evidence that the District
Attorney had an unlawful policy of withholding Brady material,
which caused the violations in the Thompson prosecution, but the
jury was not persuaded.96 This meant that the failure-to-train claim
was the only issue that went up to the Supreme Court on a record that
had little, if any, evidence of prior violations, similar in kind to those
in Thompson‟s case, to provide notice of a need for better training.97
Although Justice Ginsberg‟s dissent argued that there was considerable evidence, ignored by the majority, establishing the indifference of
the District Attorney to Brady compliance, this evidence related more
to the rejected unlawful policy claim than to the specific theory before the Court of whether the District Attorney was indifferent to
training as the best way to avoid Brady violations.98
The case law between the decisions in Canton and Connick
overwhelmingly required, except in a few very narrow circumstances,
a pattern of prior similar misconduct, as opposed to just a single incident, to establish a training claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services.99 If Connick had been decided the other way, it would
have been a departure from the general rule, and would have been a
92

Id. at 300.
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365-66.
94
Id. at 1365.
95
Id. at 1377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96
Id. at 1376-77.
97
Id. at 1361, 1364 (majority opinion).
98
Compare Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1364, with id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99
436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (concluding that a city is not liable under § 1983 unless a
municipal “policy or custom” is the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation”).
93
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shock, although a shock welcomed by plaintiffs. It is important to
remember that, unlike in Cash, the Court in Connick did not address
other theories of establishing liability besides training, and revealed
no hostility to them.100 After Connick, a municipality may still be
held liable for Brady violations based upon proof of an unlawful policy to violate the law, a history of condoning such violations, or even
ratification by a policymaker of the specific violation in the case,
which would be evidence that the violation reflected and was caused
by the existence of an unlawful policy.101 These are all additional
theories of Monell liability that are unaffected by the Connick decision.102
PROFESSOR BLUM: Custom was not raised in the above
cases, such as Canton, Brown, and Connick, because in order to show
custom, there must be a pattern.103
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Furthermore, the difficulty with
Connick is that it is impossible for a plaintiff to prove what the court
required.104 The Brady rule in itself is a very intricate and difficult
concept to master and may require time to understand. Although
Brady is taught in schools, it is taught in elective courses, which
many prosecutors may not take. Therefore, it cannot be effectively
stated that training on Brady is unnecessary for prosecutors and all
lawyers alike. Case law seems to be stacked very heavily against the
plaintiff.
PROFESSOR BLUM: In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,105 the
100
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356 (holding “a district attorney‟s office may not be held
liable under § 1983 for failure to train based on a single Brady violation”); Cash, 654 F.3d at
337 (“Accordingly, even if Gallivan had no knowledge of prior sexual assaults, it was hardly
speculative for a jury to conclude that, at least by 1999, he knew or should have known that
guards at ECHC and other local correctional facilities were engaging in proscribed sexual
contact with prisoners . . . .”).
101
Cash, 654 F.3d at 337.
102
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366 (concluding that a policymaker‟s failure to train attorneys under his supervision did “not fall within the narrow range of „single-incident‟ liability . . . necessary to prove deliberate indifference in § 1983 actions alleging failure to train”);
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
103
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (noting that a government could not be sued for an injury
caused by one of its employees unless the injury was caused pursuant to the execution of a
governmental custom and “may fairly be said to represent official policy”).
104
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (requiring that defendant show that there was an obvious need to train in order to address Brady based on a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct).
105
555 U.S. 335 (2009). Goldstein had been convicted of murder but, after serving twenty-four years of his sentence, his conviction was set aside when it came to light that the
prosecution had withheld potential impeachment information regarding the critical witness
against him. Id. at 339.
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Court makes it very clear that a plaintiff cannot go after the head or
supervising prosecutor in a district attorney‟s office in his or her individual capacity for a failure-to-train claim as was done in Walker,
because the prosecutor will have absolute immunity.106
MS. KOELEVELD: In addition, the Court in Connick elucidates that a pattern is required to prove municipal liability.107 The
majority points to there being four Brady reversals in ten years and
even those did not establish a pattern sufficient to put Connick on notice of misconduct because each incident was distinct.108 The Court
stated that the issue is notice.109 What would be sufficient notice to a
municipality that they need to train, discipline, or supervise enough to
hold them liable? Likely, this issue of notice will potentially turn on
whether there is a significant pattern of similar violations signifying
the need to train, discipline, or supervise.110 Finally, the Court in
Connick suggested that even if a number of Brady violations are
identified, it would still be difficult to establish municipal liability for
failing to train prosecutors because Brady violations are so nuanced
and the specific training required is therefore not obvious.111 Of
course, it is important for prosecutors to understand, as a general matter, that evidence favorable to the defense must be turned over, and
there was no dispute in Connick that the prosecutors had that understanding.112 But beyond that general understanding, there are innumerable variations in different factual scenarios. Just as district attorney‟s offices cannot be expected to train on every such scenario, a
municipality should not be held liable because it failed to anticipate
one particular scenario or another. Merely pointing to additional
training that could have been done to avoid a particular constitutional
violation is not enough to establish municipal liability. It has to be
reasonable to expect that training to have occurred.
106

Id. The Court unanimously held that a district attorney and chief deputy district attorney had absolute immunity as to claims “that the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment
material due to: (1) a failure properly to train prosecutors, (2) a failure properly to supervise
prosecutors, or (3) a failure to establish an information system containing potential
impeachment material about informants.” Id. (citation omitted).
107
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See id. (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
„ordinarily necessary‟ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to
train.”).
111
Id. at 1363.
112
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
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MR. RUDIN: In New York, and in many jurisdictions elsewhere, there have been training programs established for assistant
district attorneys in individual county district attorney‟s offices concerning Brady compliance.113 Some of the Brady violation cases that
have been litigated under Monell, before now, involved prosecutions
that occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s before such training programs went into effect.114 In the future, cases such as Connick, where
there was no training, are unlikely to be brought successfully. However, the question in future cases may be whether the district attorney, regardless of training, can be shown to have been deliberately
indifferent to, to have condoned, or to have defended illegal conduct,
thereby revealing an unlawful policy to permit such violations.
IV.

SUPERVISORY LIABILITY – ASHCROFT V. IQBAL AND ITS
PROGENY

PROFESSOR BLUM: In a case that was about pleading requirements,115 and a case in which the issue of supervisory liability
had not been briefed or argued by the parties,116 Justice Kennedy,
writing for a five-member majority of the Court in Iqbal, changed the
conversation surrounding, and arguably the standard governing,
claims of supervisory liability in both Bivens actions117 and § 1983
113

Id. at 1363.
See, e.g., Canton, 489 U.S. at 382 (“Canton shift commanders were not provided with
any special training . . . to make a determination as to when to summon medical care for an
injured detainee.”).
115
There are many scholarly articles addressing the impact of Iqbal on pleading. See,
e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011);
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010). For a thoughtful
criticism of the decision and its ramifications for litigants and judges alike, see McCauley v.
City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 620, 622-25, 627-29 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting in
part).
116
As Justice Souter noted in his dissent, Ashcroft and Mueller had conceded “that a
supervisor‟s knowledge of a subordinate‟s unconstitutional conduct and deliberate
indifference to that conduct [were] grounds for Bivens liability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 691
(Souter, J., dissenting). The issue presented on appeal was whether the allegations of the
complaint were sufficient to state such a claim. Id. at 690. “[B]ecause of the concession,
[the Court has] received no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory
liability . . . .” Id. at 692.
117
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 389, 392, 397 (1971) (holding that an action could be brought against federal law
enforcement officials for a Fourth Amendment violation; in the absence of a statutory
114
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cases.118
In Iqbal, where the underlying constitutional claim alleged
discriminatory treatment of detainees based on race, religion, or national origin,119 the Court rejected the argument that high-level supervisory officials (Ashcroft and Mueller) could be held individually liable in a Bivens action based on “mere knowledge of [a]
subordinate‟s discriminatory purpose.”120 Justice Kennedy held that
“[i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer
for the torts of their servants—the term „supervisory liability‟ is a
misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his
or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”121 Thus, where plaintiffs allege a claim that requires the showing of discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs must allege and prove that a
supervisor himself had the impermissible purpose, not just knowledge of a subordinate‟s discriminatory purpose, in order to impose
liability under § 1983 or Bivens.122
Justice Souter, the author of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,123 dissented in Iqbal, writing that the Court is not only limiting
the scope of supervisory liability, but also completely eliminating it
in the context of Bivens.124 So, the question is whether there is such a
thing as supervisory liability after Iqbal, and, if so, how does a plaintiff go about proving it?
The Second Circuit has not spoken to this issue yet,125 but the
remedy against federal officials, the Court implied a remedy based directly on the
Constitution).
118
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 692 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“According to the majority, because
Iqbal concededly cannot recover on a theory of respondeat superior, it follows that he
cannot recover under any theory of supervisory liability.”). The only other case in which the
Court has addressed the issue of supervisory liability is Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976), where the Court recognized that the misconduct of the subordinate must be
“affirmative[ly] link[ed]” to the action or inaction of the supervisor. Id. at 371.
119
Former Attorney General, John Ashcroft, and Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Robert Mueller, were among high-ranking officials named by Iqbal in a Bivens
action complaining of harsh treatment and conditions during his confinement in the wake of
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666. He claimed that certain
detainees were selected to be of high interest and treated harshly because of their race,
religion, or national origin. Id. at 666, 668-69.
120
Id. at 677.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
124
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125
See Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 205 n.14 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Iqbal has, of course,
engendered conflict within our Circuit about the continuing vitality of the supervisory
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debate circulating in the Second Circuit is about whether and to what
extent the Colon v. Coughlin126 factors are still viable.127 Colon sets
out five ways that supervisory liability may be shown,128 but some
district courts believe that after Iqbal, three of those categories may
no longer apply.129 Therefore, the two ways that may remain are
where the supervisor directly participates in the constitutional violation or where the supervisor implements a policy or custom that violates the Constitution.130 Some courts have suggested that the other
methods of establishing supervisory liability based on knowledge and
acquiescence in underlying constitutional wrongs committed by subordinates, recklessness, gross negligence, and other similar standards,
are all in question now.131
In the wake of Iqbal, there have been few appellate cases with
extensive discussions of the supervisory liability issue. The First,
Third, and Eighth Circuits have suggested that the Supreme Court‟s
decision may call into question prior circuit law on the standard for
holding a public official liable for damages under § 1983 on a theory
of supervisory liability.132 The Third Circuit has decided cases on the
liability test set forth in Colon v. Coughlin. . . . But the fate of Colon is not properly before
us . . . .” (citation omitted)).
126
58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995).
127
See id. at 873 (setting forth the five ways in which “personal involvement of a
supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence”).
128
Id.
The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by
evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional
practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates
who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information
indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.
Id. (citing Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)).
129
See, e.g., Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 129-30 (D. Conn. 2010); Sash v.
United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
130
Sash, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
131
See, e.g., Rivera v. Metro. Transit Auth., 750 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(questioning what remains after Iqbal); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ.
1801(SAS), 2009 WL 1835939, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (discussing the
categories of supervisory liability that remain after Iqbal), aff’d, 387 Fed. App‟x 55 (2d Cir.
2010).
132
See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court‟s recent pronouncement in Iqbal may further restrict the incidents in which the „failure to supervise‟ will result in liability.”); Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d
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pleadings aspect rather than going into the standards for supervisory
liability.133 The Eleventh Circuit continues to rely on pre-Iqbal
precedent that allows for supervisory liability where a supervisor personally participates in the constitutional violation or where there is a
causal connection between the unconstitutional conduct and the supervisor‟s action or inaction.134 Many lower courts are parroting the
language of Iqbal that supervisory liability is a “misnomer,” but are
continuing to apply pre-Iqbal law until their circuits decide the is-

186, 191 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In light of the Supreme Court‟s recent decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of such personal knowledge, with nothing more, would
provide a sufficient basis for holding Bahl liable with respect to plaintiffs‟ Fourteenth
Amendment claims under § 1983.” (citation omitted)); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d
263, 275 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Some recent language from the Supreme Court may call into
question our prior circuit law on the standard for holding a public official liable for damages
under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability.”); see also Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221,
1227 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) (refusing to “stake out a position” in the debate about Iqbal‟s impact on supervisory liability standard where claim failed even under pre-Iqbal standard);
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding no plausible supervisory liability claim stated against administrative correctional officials where plaintiff merely parroted standard for supervisory liability).
133
See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d
Cir. 2011) (“To date, we have refrained from answering the question of whether Iqbal
eliminated—or at least narrowed the scope of—supervisory liability . . . .”); Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128-34, 130 n.8, 134 n.10 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Because we
hold that Santiago‟s pleadings fail even under our existing supervisory liability test, we need
not decide whether Iqbal requires us to narrow the scope of that test.”).
134
See, e.g., Am. Fed‟n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d
1178, 1190 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A supervisor can be held liable for the actions of his subordinates under § 1983 if he personally participates in the act that causes the constitutional violation or where there is a causal connection between his actions and the constitutional violation
that his subordinates commit.”); Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1266
(11th Cir. 2010) (“ „It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are not liable . . . for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates‟ unless the „supervisor personally
participates in the alleged constitutional violation‟ or „there is a causal connection between
actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.‟ ” (quoting
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999))); Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 763-65 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that the protestors satisfied § 1983‟s pleading requirements for a supervisory liability claim “by alleging a casual connection” between those
of authority in the Miami Police Department and the acts of the “subordinate officers” who
followed their direction); Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Supervisory liability lies where the defendant personally participates in the unconstitutional conduct or there is a causal connection between such conduct and the defendant‟s actions.”); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[S]upervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and
the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).
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sue.135
Circuits that have addressed the issue of supervisory liability
have stated that deliberate indifference is still a standard that applies
for supervisory liability where the underlying constitutional standard
is deliberate indifference.136 Therefore, for example, if there is a
Fourteenth Amendment medical-needs claim in a prison context,
where the constitutional standard itself is one of subjective deliberate
indifference, actual knowledge and a failure to do anything, then if
that requisite state of mind is demonstrated on the part of the supervisor, there would be supervisory liability in most circuits.
In Sandra T.E. v. Grindle,137 the Seventh Circuit addressed
supervisory liability in the context of an interlocutory appeal by a
school principal who was denied qualified immunity with respect to
both equal protection and substantive due process claims arising from
the sexual abuse of female students by a music teacher.138 The court
noted that after Iqbal, the plaintiff would have to make out a showing
of intentional discrimination on the equal protection claim to hold the
supervisor liable.139 Thus, while the court‟s “precedent would have
previously allowed a plaintiff to recover from a supervisor based on
that supervisor‟s „deliberate indifference‟ toward a subordinate‟s
purposeful discrimination, after Iqbal a plaintiff must also show that
the supervisor possessed the requisite discriminatory intent.”140 The
court went on to find that there was sufficient evidence from which a
jury could find that the principal knew about the teacher‟s abuse and
acted deliberately to cover it up.141 Based on this evidence, “a jury
could reasonably infer—though it would not be required to infer—
135

See, e.g., Steen v. City of Pensacola, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346-48 (N.D. Fla. 2011)
(acknowledging that courts have “arrived at differing interpretations following the decision
in Iqbal”).
136
See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiff
adequately asserted a deliberate indifference claim), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012);
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that under § 1983, a
plaintiff is allowed “to impose liability upon a defendant-supervisor who creates,
promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for the continued
operation of a policy the enforcement” which denies plaintiff of a basic constitutional right);
Sandra T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 591 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When a state actor‟s deliberate
indifference deprives someone of his or her protected liberty interest in bodily integrity, that
actor violates the Constitution, regardless of whether the actor is a supervisor or subordinate,
and the actor may be held liable for the resulting harm.”).
137
599 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2010).
138
Id. at 585.
139
Id. at 588.
140
Id. (citation omitted).
141
Id. at 588-89.
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that [the principal] also had a purpose of discriminating against the
girls based on their gender.”142 Turning to the substantive due
process claim, the court found that the plaintiffs‟ allegations were not
based on a theory of supervisory liability for a failure to act, but rather were directed at the principal‟s own misconduct in depriving
them of “their constitutional right to bodily integrity.”143 The plaintiffs alleged that the principal “actively conceal[ed] reports of abuse
and creat[ed] an atmosphere that allowed abuse to flourish.”144 The
court concluded that “[w]hen a state actor‟s deliberate indifference
deprives someone of his or her protected liberty interest in bodily integrity, that actor violates the Constitution, regardless of whether the
actor is a supervisor or subordinate, and the actor may be held liable
for the resulting harm.”145
The most extensive treatment of supervisory liability postIqbal appears in the Tenth Circuit opinion of Dodds v. Richardson.146
The plaintiff in Dodds sued a county sheriff whom he claimed violated his constitutional right by being deliberately indifferent to a policy that disallowed bail set in an arrest warrant to be posted after
hours or until the arrestee had been arraigned by a judge, which resulted in plaintiff‟s unjustified weekend detention after bail had been
set.147 The defendant, relying on Iqbal, argued that he could not be
held liable unless “he personally participated in such a violation with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”148 Noting that “[d]efendant‟s
argument implicates important questions about the continuing vitality
of supervisory liability under § 1983 after the Supreme Court‟s recent
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,”149 the court relied on the “causes to be
subjected” language of § 1983 to conclude that personal involvement
does not require direct participation in the constitutional violation.150
The court explained:
Whatever else can be said about Iqbal, and certain-

142

Sandra T.E., 599 F.3d at 589.
Id. at 590.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 591.
146
614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th
Cir. 2010) (“Simply put, there‟s no special rule of liability for supervisors. The test for them
is the same as the test for everyone else.”).
147
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1189.
148
Id. at 1194.
149
Id. (citation omitted).
150
Id. at 1199 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
143
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ly much can be said, we conclude the following basis
of § 1983 liability survived it and ultimately resolves
this case: § 1983 allows a plaintiff to impose liability
upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for the continued operation of a policy the
enforcement (by the defendant-supervisor or her subordinates) of which “subjects, or causes to be subjected” that plaintiff “to the deprivation of any
rights . . . secured by the Constitution . . . .” A plaintiff may therefore succeed in a § 1983 suit against a
defendant-supervisor by demonstrating: (1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed
responsibility for the continued operation of a policy
that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm,
and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.151
The court found sufficient evidence to support the first two
requirements, active maintenance of the policy and causation of the
constitutional injury,152 and then proceeded to address the question of
whether the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind required
to violate plaintiff‟s substantive due process right to post preset bail
and not be subjected to over detention.153 The court concluded that,
after Iqbal, a showing of deliberate indifference or knowledge and
acquiescence would no longer suffice to establish supervisory liability “unless that is the same state of mind required for the constitutional” violation alleged.154 Because neither party challenged the district
court‟s determination that deliberate indifference was the applicable
standard, the Court of Appeals assumed (but did not decide) that “deliberate indifference constitutes the requisite state of mind.”155 Significantly, the “deliberate indifference” required in Dodds is of the
subjective or constitutional type, not the Canton statutory or objective
type.156 In concluding that plaintiff had presented enough facts to
support the conclusion that the defendant had acted with deliberate
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. (alterations in original).
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1204.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1205.
Id.
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indifference, the court relied on two cases that involved Fourteenth
Amendment due process violations where plaintiffs were required to
show that a defendant supervisor had actual subjective knowledge of
the risk of constitutional injury and disregarded the risk.157
In Starr v. Baca,158 the plaintiff was a former county jail inmate who alleged that he had been beaten by a deputy sheriff while
other deputies looked on.159 The complaint also alleged that there
had been numerous incidents in which inmates in county jails had
been killed or injured because of such conduct on the part of the Sheriff‟s deputies, and that, despite having been given notice of such
wrongful conduct by his subordinates, the Sheriff did nothing to protect inmates under his care.160 In evaluating the claim of supervisory
liability against Sheriff Baca, the court stated:
We see nothing in Iqbal indicating that the Supreme Court intended to overturn longstanding case
law on deliberate indifference claims against supervisors in conditions of confinement cases. We also note
that, to the extent that our sister circuits have confronted this question, they have agreed with our interpretation of Iqbal. . . .
We therefore conclude that a plaintiff may state a
claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference
based upon the supervisor‟s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her
subordinates.161
In Hydrick v. Hunter,162 on remand from the Supreme Court
in light of Iqbal,163 the Ninth Circuit panel distinguished the allegations in the complaint in Hydrick from the more factually specific allegations in Baca, and found the complaint filed by civilly committed
persons in a state hospital insufficient under Iqbal to state Fourth and
First Amendment claims against the supervisory officials of the hos157
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1205-06 (citing Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir.
2009)); Serna v. Colo. Dep‟t of Corrs., 455 F.3d 1146, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2006).
158
652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
159
Id. at 1204.
160
Id. at 1216.
161
Id. at 1207 (citation omitted).
162
669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012).
163
Hunter v. Hydrick, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009).
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pital in their individual capacities.164
Baca was denied rehearing en banc.165 Dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc, Judge O‟Scannlain characterized the majority‟s application of Iqbal as “Iqbal Lite,” and concluded the following:
The court‟s ruling today conflicts with Iqbal in its
statement of the pleading standard, in its application of
the pleading standard, and in its far-reaching conclusions regarding supervisory liability. By failing to rehear this case en banc, we fail to correct these errors
and once again must wait for the Supreme Court to do
so for us.166
The Supreme Court evidently was not eager to jump back into the issue of supervisory liability and denied the petition for certiorari.167

164

Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 939.
See Starr v. City of L.A., 659 F.3d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A judge of the court
called for a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. A vote was taken, and a majority of
the active judges of the court failed to vote for en banc rehearing.”).
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Id. at 852, 855 (O‟Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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Starr, 659 F.3d 850, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012). A more recent decision by
the Ninth Circuit, published after this program and as this article was going to print, may
give the Supreme Court another opportunity to clarify the law on supervisory liability. In
OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2012), the court provides a lengthy
discussion of supervisory liability in a case brought by a student organization against state
university officials, alleging First Amendment violations resulting from a policy with respect
to the placement of student newspaper bins. The court notes that “[p]ut simply,
constitutional tort liability after Iqbal depends primarily on the requisite mental state for the
violation alleged,” and that “while a specific intent requirement inheres in claims for
invidious discrimination, the same requirement does not inhere in claims for free speech
violations.” Id. at 1071, 1075. Judge Ikuta, in dissent, observes:
In place of personal misconduct and causation, the majority substitutes
mere knowledge of a lower-ranking employee's misconduct. But this is
the very standard Iqbal rejected, because it makes officials responsible
for lower-ranking employees' misdeeds merely by virtue of the officials'
positions in the organization. By adopting this standard, the majority returns us to pre-Iqbal jurisprudence and revives vicarious liability, at least
for First Amendment claims.
Id. at 1081 (Ikuta, J., dissenting in part).
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CONCLUSION

Connick and Iqbal leave many questions unanswered with respect to claims asserting entity and individual liability under § 1983.
Litigants should pay close attention to the law in their circuits and
keep a watchful eye for the next case to reach the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court will have to revisit the issue of supervisory liability to clarify the scope of such liability and what standard applies after Iqbal. But, as they say, be careful what you wish
for.
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